The reformulated helplessness model of depression predicts that depressed persons attribute negative life events to internal, stable, and global causes while attributing positive life events to external, unstable, and specific causes. In addition to these hypotheses, the present author predicted that depressed students would attribute negative life events to more controllable causes, compared with nondepressed students. A third prediction was that depressed students' controllable causal attributions would be more closely related to independent judgments of the controllability of events than would the attributions of nondepressed students. These predictions were examined using a less structured methodology than previous studies. Forty-five depressed and 46 nondepressed female college students reported important personal events, provided untutored explanations of their causes, and rated the importance of particular causes of these events. Results confirmed predictions for the internal dimension (p < .01) and for the controllable dimension for negative events (p < .05) but not for the stable dimension. Results did not support the prediction that depressed students' attributions to controllable causes would appear more similar to judges' ratings of the controllability of events.
The reformulated learned helplessness model of depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) predicts that depressionprone individuals characteristically attribute undesirable (negative) events to internal, stable, and global causes which results in lowered self-esteem and in helplessness. This attribution theory reformulation also implies (although not as an explicit prediction of the model) that depression-prone individuals tend to attribute desirable (positive) events to external, unstable, and specific causes.
Four experimental studies have addressed these predictions by comparing the causal attributions of depressed and nondepressed students after induced success and failure experiences (Klein, Fencil-Morse, & Selig-man, 1976; Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978 ; Litman-Adizes, Note 1). All of these investigations found that depressed students rated internal factors (i.e., ability or effort) as more important causes of failure than did nondepressed students. However, only one study (Rizley, 1978) found that depressed students rated external factors (i.e., luck or task difficulty) as more important causes of success than did nondepressed students. Finally, of the three studies that assessed the stable dimension of causal attributions (Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978 ; Litman-Adizes, Note 1), none found significant group differences on this dimension for success or failure conditions. None of these studies assessed the global dimension of causal attributions.
In contrast to previous studies, in which subjects rated the importance of specific causal factors, Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, and von Baeyer (1979) assessed the internal-external, stable-unstable, and globalspecific dimensions directly by using their Attributional Style Scale. They found that depressed students, compared with nondepressed students, attributed bad outcomes to internal, stable, and global causes and good outcomes to external and unstable, but not global causes.
These studies lend partial support to an attribution model of depression, suggesting that depressed individuals attribute causes of failure to themselves to a greater degree than nondepressed individuals. However, the generalizability and validity of these results may be limited by the artificial and structured methods used to assess attributional style. It remains an open question whether subjects readily employ causal explanations that are reliably identifiable in terms of Abramson et al.'s (1978) causal dimensions when not prompted by an achievement-related situation and guided by structured rating scales (cf. Wortman & Dintzer, 1978) . The contrived nature of the events subjects explained in these studies also leaves open the question of whether depressed and nondepressed subjects differ when explaining personally important events. In the experimental studies, the events were defined as success or failure-terms that imply causal responsibility of the subject. Under these conditions, different styles of response to experimental demand between depressed and nondepressed subjects (e.g., acquiescent versus social desirability response sets) may have contributed to group differences on cognitive measures when subjects were asked to explain themselves in an evaluative context. The present study attempted to minimize these methodological difficulties by eliciting unstructured causal explanations of naturally occurring events; the stated focus of the investigation was on evaluating the events, not the subjects.
Attributions to Controllable Causes
Besides employing a less structured methodology than previous investigations of depressive attributional style, the present study included an assessment of the controllability of perceived causes. Abramson et al. (1978) described this dimension as logically orthogonal to the other causal dimensions (internal-external, stable-unstable, and globalspecific) but probably empirically correlated with internal and unstable attributions. They also suggested that attributions to controllable causes may be related to self-blame.
However, since they did not include the controllable dimension of causes in their attribution model of depression, internal attributions for aversive outcomes must account not only for feelings of personal helplessness and self-devaluation, but also for self-blame.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that the internal dimension alone can sufficiently describe the cognitive basis for self-blame. If one assumes, as Abramson and Sackeim did (1977, p. 847) , that people are blamed only for what is presumed to be intentional, then blame by others and by oneself hinges on whether the cause of a negative event is perceived as controllable. Internal causes are not always perceived as controllable, therefore the internal dimension can not sufficiently account for self-blame. The controllable dimension of causes is needed to begin to adequately assess the cognitions underlying the helplessness/self-blame paradox in depression (Abramson & Sackeim, 1977) .
The controllable dimension of causes is also important in distinguishing between helplessness and low self-esteem models of depression. Given the central role of uncontrollability in the reformulated learned helplessness model of depression (Abramson et al., 1978) , this model appears to predict that depressives more often attribute outcomes to uncontrollable causes. In this vein, Litman-Adizes (Note 1) found that, given either success or failure, depressed college students rated themselves as having less control over the causes of their outcomes than nondepressed students. In contrast to the learned helplessness model, Beck's (1967) model focuses on the depressive's negative attitudes toward the self. As is consistent with Beck's model, Rizley (1978) found that given either positive or negative interpersonal events, depressed students rated themselves as having greater responsibility than did nondepressed students.
Cognitive Bases for Differences in Attributional Style
One method for investigating differences in the interpretation of events has been to compare the attributions of actors with those of observers (e.g., Cunningham, Starr, & Kanouse, 1979, investigating causal attri- butions for positive/negative events; Gather & Hollon, 1980, investigating expectancies of depressed and nondepressed subjects). In the present study, the internal and controllable causal attributions of depressed and nondepressed subjects were compared with ratings of the controllability of their life events made by independent judges. It was predicted that the causal attributions of depressed subjects would be more closely related to judges' ratings of controllability than would the causal attributions of nondepressed subjects. This prediction was based on the apparent similarity of the predicted depressive attributional style to the tendency sometimes found of observers to make dispositional attributions (Jones & Nisbett, 1971) . This expected similarity was also derived from findings suggesting that depressives are (a) more "realistic" than nondepressives in evaluating their own social competency when observers' ratings are used as criteria (Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980) ; (b) quite accurate in their judgments of degree of contingency between their own responses and the outcomes obtained (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) ; and (c) less likely to show an illusion of control in games of chance (Golin, Terrell, Weitz, & Drost, 1979) . In the sense conveyed by these findings, it was assumed the judges in the present study would tend to be "realistic" and "unbiased" in their interpretations of the subjects' events and that depressed subjects would appear to share their perspective in explaining their events.
The present study examined the following hypotheses:
1. As Abramson et al. (1978) predicted, depressed subjects, when compared to nondepressed subjects, were expected to attribute negative events more to internal, stable, and global causes while attributing positive events more to external, unstable, and specific causes.
2. Since self-blame was assumed to be a common symptom of depressed college students, depressed subjects, compared with nondepressed subjects, were expected to attribute negative events more to controllable causes and positive events more to uncontrollable causes. This prediction was consistent with Beck's (1967) model of depression but inconsistent with Abramson et al.'s (1978) reformulated learned helplessness model.
3. It was predicted that the attributions of depressed subjects, as compared with those of nondepressed subjects, would be more closely aligned with judges' ratings of the controllability of their life events. This prediction was seen as consistent with recent findings regarding the cognitions of depressed persons but inconsistent with the description of depressive cognitions as unrealistic and distorted (cf. Beck, 1967) .
Method

Selection of Subjects
Subjects were 129 female undergraduates in an introductory psychology class who participated in a "Life Stage Study of College Students," in partial fulfillment of their course requirements. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967) was chosen as the most commonly used, practical, and well-validated (Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978) measure of depth of depression available. The BDI scores of the total sample ranged from 0 to 30 (M = 8.21, SD = 5.72). Using predetermined cut scores, subjects who received scores of 5 or less on the BDI were defined as nondepressed; those receiving scores of 10 or more were defined as depressed. This selection procedure yielded 46 subjects in the nondepressed group (M = 2.63) and 45 in the depressed group (M = 14.53). Only the protocols of these subjects were used in further analyses.
Procedure
Groups of about 25 female students were administered a "Life Stage Study" questionnaire followed by the BDI. Complete instructions were printed in the questionnaire.
Subjects were asked to list three important positive/ pleasing events and three important negative/disturbing events that had happened recently. They then rated the positive and negative events on 7-point scales that ranged from somewhat to very positive/pleasing or negative/disturbing.
Unstructured causal attributions were elicited for two undesignated life events (the two middle rated events) and four designated life events by asking subjects to "thoroughly explain the causes of the event in your honest opinion" on the blank pages (8'/2 X 14 inches) of the questionnaire. The two undesignated events were defined as an important "positive/pleasing" event and an important "negative/disturbing" event that had happened recently. The four designated events were defined as (a) "a specific, concrete academic success you have had"; (b) "a relationship in which something negative/ disturbing happened ... a negative interpersonal episode"; (c) "a positive/pleasing interpersonal episode"; and (d) "an academic failure."
Structured ratings of causes were elicited for the two undesignated events after subjects had written their explanations for all six events described above. The procedure described by Rizley (1978) was employed. Subjects read definitions of four types of causes: factors or other people in the situation, effort or personal motivation, chance, and ability or personal characteristics. On two pages each with six separate 7-point rating scales, subjects rated the importance of these causes in determining their undesignated positive event and their undesignated negative event. Following these four cause ratings, subjects indicated how much control they had "over the primary causes of the event" and how much responsibility they felt for the event's happening. 1 
Causal Attribution Coding Procedures
A scheme for coding the unstructured causal attributions in four dimensions was developed on the basis of Abramson et al.'s (1978) discussion of causal attributions. The internal-external dimension was defined as referring to the locus of the cause. The recurrenttransient dimension referred to whether the cause was likely "to stay around to continue to operate in a similar fashion" or not. (Recurrent and transient were used rather than stable and unstable to avoid notational confusion in the coding.) The global-specific dimension referred to whether the cause affected a wide variety of outcomes or not, and the controllable-uncontrollable dimension referred to whether or not the cause was "controlled (or likely to be controlled) by this person through his choice, will, or agency." The four dimensions were defined as logically orthogonal to each other such that any combination was possible. Judges were instructed to code the person's explanations according to how that individual might see it.
2
Blind to the hypotheses and focus (depression) of the study, three trained female undergraduates independently coded each cause given in the protocols as internal or external, recurrent or transient, global or specific, and controllable or uncontrollable. Proportions of internal, stable, global, and controllable causes given for an event were used in subsequent analyses.
Interjudge reliability was estimated by an analysis of variance (Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972; Winer, 1971 ) that yields a generalizability coefficient as an index of reliability for a composite of judges. The proportions of types of causes were averaged across the undesignated, academic, and interpersonal events for positive and for negative events. Using these mean proportions, the generalizability coefficients for positive and negative events, respectively, were internal, . 86, .81; stable, .79, .82; global, .42, .44; controllable, .70, .81 . Since the reliability for the global dimension was low, this dimension was not included in subsequent analyses. The proportion of controllable causes given was highly correlated with the proportion of internal causes for both positive and negative events (r = .78 and .79, respectively, p < .001). The proportion of controllable causes was negatively related to the proportion of stable causes only for negative events (r = -.22, p < .03).
Life Event Rating Procedure
Since the life events subjects explained were chosen by themselves and not experimentally controlled, differences in the recall or occurrence of events, rather than differences in level of depression per se, could have accounted for any differences obtained in attributional style. To examine this potential confounding source of variance, the two undesignated events were independently rated for desirability, importance, and controllability. These three dimensions of events have been proposed as determinants of stressfulness (Dohrenwend, 1977) .
Brief descriptions of the subjects' undesignated events were rated by three female undergraduates and three female graduate psychology students. Raters indicated on 7-point scales (a) how positive/pleasing (or negative/ disturbing) the event would be for an average undergraduate woman, (b) how potentially controllable the event would be (i.e., to what extent an individual could make the event happen or make it not happen), and (c) how important the event would be (i.e., how much change the event would entail for the person). The interrater reliabilities among all six raters were computed using the procedure described above for the codings of causal attributions. The generalizability coefficients for positive and negative events, respectively, were desirability, .70, .77; controllability, .82, .90; and importance, .90, .86.
To test for differences in the nature of events between the depressed and nondepressed students, the composite ratings of their events by the six judges were used in a multivariate analysis of variance, which was nonsignificant. The subjects' own ratings of the desirability of their two undesignated events also showed no differences between groups in the nature of the events they explained. Some of the types of events more frequently explained by subjects included academic successes and failures, problems with friends and boyfriends, and health and family-related problems.
Results
In the analyses that follow, the degrees of freedom vary slightly because subjects with missing data for an analysis were not included in that analysis.
Unstructured Causal Attributions
The untutored explanations subjects gave for all six events were coded by three peer judges. The proportions of internal, stable, and controllable causal attributions were computed for each event, and the averaged composites of the three judges were used in the data analysis.
The mean proportions of causal attributions (averaged over the three positive and the three negative events) were subjected to a general linear model multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA; Christiansen, Helms, & Hosking, 1979) with depressed/nondepressed as the between-subjects factor and positive/negative event as a repeated measure. The predicted interaction between level of depression and evaluative nature of life events was found, F(3, 84) = 4.78, p < .01.
The MANOVA for the simple main effect of level of depression within the positive events was significant (see Table 1 for mean proportions and F tests). The depressed subjects gave significantly fewer internal causes for their positive events than did the nondepressed subjects.
The MANOVA for the simple main effect of level of depression within the negative events revealed a nonsignificant but marked trend (p < .07). The multivariate F may have been diminished by the high correlation between internal and controllable causal attributions (r = .79). Although the fact is limited in meaningfulness, it is of interest to note that the depressed subjects gave more internal causes and more controllable causes for their negative events. These results are presented visually in Figure 1 .
Structured Ratings of Causes
Mean ratings of cause as situation factors, effort, chance, and ability as well as ratings of control over causes and responsibility for events, together with the F tests, are presented in Table 2 . The procedures used to analyze these data were the same as described for the unstructured causal attributions.
It was predicted that depressed students, to a greater degree than nondepressed students, attribute negative events to internal (ability and effort) and stable (ability and situation) factors and attribute positive events to external (situation and chance) and unstable (effort and chance) factors. Analyses of the subjects' own ratings of the causes of their two undesignated events provided little support for these predictions.
As with the unstructured causal attributions, the MANOVA revealed a significant interaction between level of depression and the evaluative nature of events, F(6, 84) = 2.52, p < .05. MANOVA tests for simple main effects of level of depression revealed that the depressed and nondepressed subjects did not differ in their ratings of causes for positive events but did differ in their ratings for negative events. As predicted, depressed subjects rated ability as a significantly more important cause of their negative events. Depressed subjects also accepted significantly more responsibility and attributed significantly more control over the causes of their negative events to self than did nondepressed subjects.
Comparison of Subjects' Causal Attributions With Judges' Ratings of Events
Subjects' structured and unstructured internal and controllable causal attributions for their undesignated events were compared with judges' ratings of the controllability of those events. For the structured attributions, the index of internal attributions consisted of the sum of the ratings of internal factors (ability, effort) minus the sum of the ratings of external factors (situation, chance). The index of controllable attributions was the one presumably controllable factor (effort) minus the weighted sum of the uncontrollable factors (ability + situation + chance/3). These two indexes, along with the proportions of unstructured internal and controllable attributions, were transformed to the 7-point scale of the judges' ratings of controllability. This procedure yielded four measures of subjects' attributions for positive events and four for negative events that could be compared with the appropriate judge rating of controllability. These measures were subjected to MANOVA with level of depression as the between-subjects' factor and subjects' attributions versus judges' ratings as a repeated measure.
The actor-observer hypothesis (Jones & Nisbett, 1971) received support, as the judges' ratings of controllability were consistently higher than subjects' attributions to internal and controllable causes, F(8, 80) = 17.11, p < .001. Univariate analyses revealed significant discrepancies between judges' ratings of controllability and subjects' attributions for five of the eight contrasts, ps < .001 in every case.
However, the prediction that depressed subjects' causal attributions would be less discrepant from judges' ratings than nondepressed subjects' attributions was not supported by the MANOVA test for the interaction, F(8, 80) = 1.87, p < .08. Contrary to this prediction, the depressed subjects' attributions for positive events tended to be more discrepant from judges' ratings as compared with the nondepressed subjects.
Discussion
The results only partially support the reformulated learned helplessness model of depression (Abramson, et al., 1978) , in that the predicted differences between depressed and nondepressed students' attributions were found only for the internal dimension of causal attributions. No differences were found for the stable dimension, and the global dimension of causes could not be reliably identified. Although depressed students did attribute negative personal events more to ability-a stable as well as internal cause-it is suggested that this result be interpreted as consistent with the results for the unstructured causal attributions, namely that depressed students differed from nondepressed students in their internal causal attributions. These mostly negative findings corroborate the similar results of previous investigations (Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978) that also found expected differences for the internal, but not the stable, dimension of causes.
The hypothesis that depressed students would attribute positive events less to controllable causes and negative events more to controllable causes was partially supported by the results for their unstructured causal attributions and by their ratings of controllability and responsibility for negative events. These results are consistent with the findings from Rizley's (1978) Experiment 2 involving interpersonal events.
Although the internal and controllable dimensions of causes were highly related, establishing the relative controllability of the depressed students' causal attributions for negative events highlights the distinction between personal efficacy or helplessness models of depression (Abramson et al, 1978; Seligman, 1975 ) and a negative self-attitude model of depression (Beck, 1967) and provides support for the latter model. Controllable causal attributions should be intimately related to self-attitudes because they imply self-blame (for negative events) or self-praise (for positive events). Indeed, subjects' differential responsiveness to the evaluative nature of events was especially pronounced for the controllable dimension of causal attributions (see Figure 1) . Whereas both groups seemed to exhibit a "self-serv-ing" attributional bias (Miller & Ross, 1975; Zuckerman, 1979) , the depressed students differed from the nondepressed students in being relatively more consistent in their attributions across positive and negative events. In light of the negative findings for the stable and global dimensions, the results of the present study more clearly support a negative self-attitude model of depression.
Cognitive Bases for Differences in Attributional Style
The relative consistency of depressed subjects in attributing personal events to internal and controllable causes appears to have contributed to the differences from the nondepressed subjects' attributions (see Figure  1) . Kuiper (1978) and Rizley (1978) made similar observations of their data. They suggested that this consistency represents the depressive's inability to discriminately respond to and make use of information provided by the environment, an interpretation consistent with the learned helplessness model (Seligman, 1975) , which explains such cognitive deficits as resulting from experiencing uncontrollable aversive outcomes. However, this interpretation seems tenuous on two counts. Most importantly, it relies on a model whose essential postulate (expectancy of uncontrollable outcomes) was not supported by findings from Rizley's (1978) study or the present study. Secondly, the cognitive deficit interpretation suggests that the consistency of the depressive's attributions represents insensitivity to the "prevailing evaluative conditions," yet the explanation of the dysphoric affect resulting from depressives' internal attributions for negative events relies on their being reactive, and therefore sensitive, to the evaluative nature of the event. These two propositions are incompatible.
The present author assumed that the relative consistency of depressives' causal attributions reflects the perspective of a critical, discerning observer whose attributions do not exhibit the self-serving bias (Zuckerman, 1979) often found for actors. However, the comparison of depressed subjects' causal attributions with the judge's ratings of the controllability of their events did not support this hypothesis.
The failure to find any similarity between depressed subjects' and judges' attributions may have resulted from not taking into account the attitudes of the judges. In his review of studies of attributions for success and failure, Zuckerman (1979) concluded that for self/other studies (where the other is competitively involved in the tasks), the other's attributions tended to be "counterdefensive" (from selfs point of view). However, for actor/observer studies, particularly those where the observer is instructed to be "empathic," the results did not show the observer's attributional style to be counterdefensive. The independent judges in the present study, far from being critical, may have taken an empathic perspective in interpreting the subjects' events.
In conclusion, depressed college students were found to differ from nondepressed college students in their internal and controllable causal attributions for important personal events without being prompted by structured causal questions. These results support the validity of previous research on depression and attributional style among college students. Since the present study sampled only nonclinically depressed females, these results would not necessarily hold for males or a clinically depressed population. Furthermore, since the explanations of past events and the BDI scores were obtained at the same point in time, further research is needed to establish whether the relations between depression and attributional style are or are not causal.
